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Abstract
Care work may be connected with emotional and psychological exhaustion but also gratification, reward, and 
self-empowerment. Caregivers experience both positive and negative emotional states in caring situations, and 
further studies on the rewarding and energizing aspects of care may help us to broaden our understanding of 
how we can reduce the degree of burden while increasing the sense of satisfaction. 
This article shows how the focus on emotion is a necessary step to show the ambivalences and the grey areas 
connected with the concept of care as well as to challenge the not fully explored assumption that care is often 
associated with burden and stress and viewed as a result of circumstances. It reports the findings of a micro-
situated study of daily care activities among 80 caregivers. Care is seen as a strategic site to grasp deeper 
insights into the interactional mechanisms through which the emotional dynamics revolving around care 
produce unanticipated outcomes in terms of symbolic and practical productivity.
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The study of emotions in everyday life helps remedy the  
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appreciate the hidden sensual and aesthetic foundations  
of the self.
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INTRODUCTION
Care is a complex phenomenon and is becoming all the more so due to the ongoing 
demographic trends and cultural transformations involving family, parenthood, marriage, 
cohabitation, and an increasingly aging population. The flexible character of its definition, at 
the intersection between informal communities and formal organizations, makes the 
phenomenon of care quite problematic and in need of further specification. This is because 
care transcends typical distinctions between work and leisure, public and private, and 
productive and reproductive relations. The complex nature of care leaves open several 
unsolved contradictions, notably those connected with the gendered definition of private and 
public spheres. 
What exactly are individuals doing when they engage in care work? What are its 
symbolic and social implications? How are symbols of care created and how do they circulate 
differently for different caregivers? How does care work intertwine emotional/inner processes 
and public/outer processes involving power and status dimensions? Starting from these 
central questions, I present here a close scrutiny of informal care, which I define as unpaid 
and non-professional care of a physical, emotional, and social nature that is provided by  
partners, relatives, or friends. I discuss the emotional implications of care by focusing on 
different kinds of care arrangements, as they emerge in different kinds of family contexts and 
other forms of intimate relationships. The interactional dynamics of unpaid care relationships 
have been central to an ethic of care as developed by many care theorists in the last twenty-
five years (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984; Tronto, 1994; Held, 2006). The focus in this 
article is on the role of emotion in unpaid care relationships.
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Emotion is a fundamental component in showing the ambivalences and the grey areas 
connected with the concept of care and challenging the assumption that care work is 
associated with burden and stress and a result of circumstances or default. Informal care may 
be connected with emotional and psychological exhaustion, but also with emotional and 
psychological gratification, reward, self-empowerment, and energizing processes. 
Nonetheless, there has been considerably less published on the positive aspects of care. By 
shedding light on the less visible and less investigated nature of care and its deep connections 
with emotions, I will shed light on the latent purposes of care, purposes that diverge 
substantially from the manifest purposes of tending to and looking after someone. In doing 
this, I aim to contribute to the project of a general theory of care, which has been pursued by 
a range of scholars (Tronto 1994; Thomas 1993; Leira 1994; Graham 1991; Bubeck 1995; 
Fisher and Tronto 1990; Ruddick 1998; Noddings 2003; Kittay and Feder 2002).
The analysis is carried out in light of approaches to the sociology of emotions that 
have already inspired a rich research agenda: addressing the emotional mechanisms through 
which social structures are interactionally and situationally reproduced (Kemper 1990; 
Gordon 1990; Collins 1990, 1993, 2004; Katz 1999; Barbalet 2001; Scheff 1990; Turner 
1999, 2000; Hammond 1990). More specifically, I describe how the emotional dynamics 
revolving around care can challenge our conventional view of care-related inequality and 
produce unexpected outcomes in terms of symbolic and practical productivity. In what 
follows, I briefly review current theoretical perspectives on care and illustrate how emotions 
can help us to unpack and highlight its less visible rationales.
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT CARE?
Recent feminist research suggests that both the conceptual and empirical boundaries between 
formal and informal care are dissolving in ways that have gendered impacts. Yet the 
theoretical dispute on the dissolving boundaries between the two kinds of care still seems to 
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be open (Graham 1991; Thomas 1993; Ungerson 1995, 1997; Himmelweit 1999). As well, 
care theorists have argued that care activities are different from, but need to be integrated 
with, other activities in both the economic and political spheres (Hochschild 1983; Zelizer 
2005; Folbre and Nelson 2000). 
Some early care theorists emphasized the emotional components of care, describing 
care as meaningful and fulfilling to many women and viewing care as a model to be extended 
to the larger social arena (Gilligan 1982; Ruddick 1998). Others emphasized the practical/ 
material components of care, describing care as oppressive to women, who are compelled to 
provide care by a variety of material and ideological forces (Finch and Groves, 1983).
As a concept, “care” encompasses both instrumental tasks and affective relations, 
ranging from activity to ethics, that is, from “taking charge” of others’ physical well-being to 
“feeling concern” for others’ physical and psychological well-being (Graham 1983; Noddings 
1984; Ruddick 1998; Thomas 1993; Leira 1994; Kittay 1999; Kittay and Feder 2003). It 
defines a particular kind of work, an activity directed to identify and meet the needs or well-
being of certain others, and it challenges dichotomous thinking opposing head with heart and 
rationality with emotion (Waerness, 1984). 
The composite nature of informal care has been central to an ethic of care as 
developed by many care theorists in the last twenty-five years, notably in the contributions of 
Gilligan (1982), Noddings (1984), Tronto (1994) and Held (2006). However, much can still 
be learned from the sociological literature on the positive role of emotion in unpaid care. We 
can expand on these contributions by referring to Randall Collins’ theory of Interaction  
Ritual Chains (2004), according to which the essential mechanism holding society together is 
emotional rather than cognitive.
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HIGHLIGHTING THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN UNPAID CARE
Collins suggests that emotions are the common denominator of rational action because 
rationality depends on assessing the utility (the capacity to confer positive affect) of 
alternatives lines of conduct (Collins 1993, 2004). The rational actor perspective, he says, 
collides with a number of problems: first, there are a whole series of behaviors that do not fit 
with cost/benefit analysis; second, it lacks a common metric that allows actors to compare 
costs and benefits across whatever range of situations they may encounter; and third, is the 
simple evidence that people are not always compulsively-obsessed calculators.
The center of Collins’ micro-sociological explanation is not the individual but the 
situation. Interactions, not individuals, are ontologically basic, and the search for successful 
interactions is the basic human engine. Every interaction generates status and power effects, 
and one of the primary goods of a successful interaction is the feeling of solidarity with a 
group: a sense of status membership or status inclusion. Collins describes this sense of status 
membership in terms of emotional energy, which is similar to the psychological concept of 
“drive” but with a specific social orientation: it is a long-lasting emotion that builds up across 
situations and makes individuals initiate or fail to instigate interactions. It is a feeling of 
confidence and enthusiasm for social interaction (2004, p. 108). 
Emotional energy is thus both the ingredient and the outcome of the interaction. 
People’s choices, behaviors, and decisions regarding daily-life issues are in fact based on the 
emotional outcomes and inputs and people’s chance to gain or lose emotional energy is 
strongly affected by their perceived sense of status membership. In other words, within such a 
model, people’s choices circuit in the loop of emotional energy production and we can think 
about social stratification as an unequal distribution of emotional energy rather than an 
unequal distribution of material resources or social positions. Moreover, we can empirically 
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visualize social stratification through a careful analysis of how emotional stratification is 
enacted in micro-situations. 
THE SUBJECTS OF CARE – SAMPLE AND METHODS
My critical interpretive inquiry1 draws on a multi-method approach: semi-structured in-depth 
interviews, weekly diaries, participant observation, online discussion forums between 
members of parents’ associations, ongoing conversations with the respondents beyond the 
interview context, key-informants interviews, secondary sources on informal care and 
parenthood collected from adoption agencies and local associations, journal and newspaper 
articles, and the web. Between winter 2005 and summer 2007, I interviewed 80 caregivers, 
mostly living in the Philadelphia urban and suburban areas.2 The respondents were different 
in terms of gender, sexual orientation, and marital status. Both child care and elderly care 
were included in my study, although parental care is the main kind of informal care I 
explored. The sample included gay/lesbian caregivers not only because they have been thus 
far excluded from the conceptual category of “normal” caregivers and from “normal” 
research on informal care, but also because they represented a key-subject to visualize the 
less explored rationales of care and the crucial role of emotion in the reproduction of social 
inequality.3 The goal of the empirical part of the research was to gain insights into how 
emotional stratification is reproduced in specific kinds of interaction ritual chains.
INTERNAL CONVERSATIONS AND PERMANENT VISITORS
1 The analysis was mostly guided by what Denzin (2001) calls  interpretive interactionism and other scholars 
have called interpretive phenomenological analysis (Smith, 2004; Smith, Jarman, and Osborn, 1999).
2 Broadly definable as belonging to middle-class and upper-middle class.
3 Research  on gay/lesbian  parenthood has  mainly concerned  the  different  styles  of  parenting,  the  different  
networks of resources, and the different developmental outcomes between children raised by lesbian and gay 
parents and those raised by heterosexual parents. No studies have considered how and under what conditions the 
caregiver’s  sexual  orientation  can  enhance  or  hinder  feelings  of  well-being,  self-confidence,  enthusiasm, 
support,  trust,  during the care  episode or  “souvenir,”  intended here  as a form of  third-order circulation of  
symbols in Collins’ terms (2004, 99).
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My argument is that we can look at care activities as chains of micro-interactions.4 The 
specific kind of interaction on which I focus is the ongoing internal dialogue between the 
subject caregiver and a whole network of generalized others, or what Norbert Wiley (1994) 
calls “permanent visitors”, that is, all those people who are variably present in our thoughts 
and with whom we are in a constant inner conversation (also McMahon 1996; Archer 2003, 
2007; and Doucet 2008). Within the context of care, the acknowledgment of the relation as a 
caring relation from both the subject caregiver and these generalized others is an essential 
condition to give visibility, entitlement, and legitimacy to the status of caregiver and to confer 
on the latter a sense of belonging to what I shall call here the intangible community of fully  
entitled and successful caregivers. 
During her permanent internal dialogue with all these visitors, the caregiver is 
constantly verifying or disconfirming her status membership. “Am I acknowledged, and 
therefore, do I feel entitled as a legitimate and successful caregiver?”—the caregiver 
constantly asks herself. In Collins’ model, status membership (or status inclusion) is the 
criterion that defines whether an interaction is successful and, therefore, whether there is an 
increase or decrease in the supplies of emotional energy. 
Care, especially in parenthood, can be lived as a site of status inclusion or exclusion, 
independent of people’s sex, marital status, or sexual orientation. One belongs to the 
community of “parents” and consequently feels excluded from other groups or communities, 
such as, for instance, the groups of single friends with different life styles, or the community 
of successful colleagues with more impressive résumés or qualifications, and so on. 
However, single parents and gay parents can experience care activities as sites of status 
exclusion in a more prescriptive and rigid way than their heterosexual counterparts. In fact, 
4 Within the continuum which in Collins’ Interaction Ritual model goes from formalized and strongly focused to 
informal and relatively unfocused interactions,  I  am mostly referring here to the informal and less focused  
interactions,  which nonetheless define clearly structured  individual reputations,  increasingly more important 
than categorical identities (2004, pp. 272, 291, and 295).
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the image of the nuclear family still provides a powerful interpretive template to cast in 
people’s minds a series of generalized others with whom people engage in internal 
conversations. For both single and gay parents, the sense of status membership in the 
community of fully entitled parents is affected by the normativity of the nuclear family; for 
gay/lesbian caregivers, it is also affected by heteronormativity. What does that mean in terms 
of feeling like fully entitled parents? Does it require a different kind of effort, for a single or a 
gay parent, to handle the issue of 'belonging' by constantly trying to attain good 'individual 
reputations' as a parent? Yes and no. Yes, it does require a different effort. Yet such a 
different effort does not automatically relocate single parents and gay parents in a subordinate 
position in terms of emotional stratification.
The fast-growing phenomenon of lesbian motherhood and the remarkable number of 
single women who opt for motherhood outside of marriage5 provide us with additional 
insights on how the self-empowering effects of the pursuit of motherhood can compensate for 
the sacrifices preceding, accompanying, and following their care choice. While they are 
tossing out conventional definitions of motherhood and family, these mothers nonetheless 
embrace quite conventional roles concerning child-rearing. By the same token, the new 
generations of gay men are more likely than their straight brothers to look for alternative and 
less conventional routes to personal affirmation and social success, and more likely to 
embrace nurturing, care-taking, and domestic activities without feeling that their masculine 
identity is threatened or their emotional energy drained (Stacey, 2005, 2006). What accounts 
for these growing phenomena? How is difference (and inequality) actually reproduced 
through care? Is the activity of care in itself—with its unequal distribution of tasks—what 
makes a difference or is it rather the ways people live, reflect on, and feel the care experience 
that account for differences and inequalities between the different kinds of caregivers?
5 See Rosanna Hertz (2006); Frank Furstenberg (2002), (2005).
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THE LATENT PURPOSES OF CARE
The internal processes of thinking and feeling care, I claim, are what mostly makes the 
difference and thus produces inequality: an inequality based on the long-term effects of the 
emotional stratification, which ultimately stems from the ongoing process of reflexivity. I, 
therefore, hypothesize that care is not only about tending to or caring for someone, but also 
about status inclusion and emotional energy production, which I suggest are its latent 
purposes. Without necessarily being aware of it, all caregivers participate in this invisible 
process of self-induced internalized stratification. Indeed, a not-so-latent purpose of care as a 
fundamental source of emotional energy production is explicitly admitted by Kendrick, who 
candidly confesses that his decision to become a father responded to a pretty much “selfish” 
fundamental desire. Caring for somebody and “being able to love somebody” makes him feel 
good, fulfilling one of the basic human emotional needs:
Yeah, I think in the broad sense is that it’s a very selfish thing, I mean I have children because 
it makes me feel good, you know […] People always say, oh, that’s such a noble thing you’re 
doing, what a wonderful thing you’re doing. No, it’s all selfish, I did it for me. The benefit is, 
I think, he is a good kid and we have a great relationship, I think I’m raising him well; but 
let’s be honest about it, I mean, that was kind of a fundamental desire, I had this need and 
there he was.
We have seen that emotional energy is the long-lasting sense of self-confidence, 
enthusiasm, and initiative that is produced by and instigates a successful interaction. A 
successful interaction generates a sense of status membership or inclusion which increases 
the supply of emotional energy and fosters the loop of emotional energy production. Care 
activities and responsibilities generate forms of group membership or status enhancement and 
consequent outcomes in terms of emotional energy that alter people’s emotional stratification. 
This in turn affects people’s ability to successfully manage future interactions. Reflexivity is 
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the essential condition by which caregivers judge their care experiences as successful or 
unsuccessful. Without denying the weight of structural and cultural factors in the 
reproduction of inequality, I claim that these factors need active mediation—the capacity and 
the willpower of individuals to act independently and to make their own choices—in order to 
be effective and productive. Through their internal conversations, individuals reflect upon 
and mould their social situation in light of care-related tasks and concerns (Wiley 1994; 
Archer 2003, 2007). These inner dialogues govern caregivers’ responses to social forces, 
their actual and potential patterns of social interaction, and whether they contribute to social 
inequality; an inequality that is based on the felt experience of care. 
The missing link between society and the individual, I suggest, is to be found in the 
production of emotional energy which occurs during the constant interaction of Self with a 
whole set of generalized others with whom the individual is in constant conversation, be it 
actual or virtual. I consider the care experience as a crucial site to observe the ongoing 
processes of reproduction of emotional stratification that is the basis of social inequality. 
These unexplored aspects of care also allow us to reframe current discourse on care and to 
challenge the assumption that care is routinely associated with burden and stress and viewed 
as a result of circumstances. In the following section, I will navigate through some of these 
astonishing and overlooked aspects of the phenomenology of care that I claim constitute its 
core nature.
THE PRODUCTIVITY OF CARE
Contrary to common belief, care does not necessarily produce stress or make people less 
productive—at least not always and not under all circumstances. Even in its most draining 
aspects, care seems to make people find their “second wind”, as William James used to call 
it: an unexpected strength and energy allowing them to overcome challenges and difficulties 
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that stem from their caring about their beloved ones.6 Far more than we are willing to admit, 
being caring also means being productive. For some, this might mean giving more attention 
to quality than to quantity; for others, it might mean keeping the same standards in terms of 
quantity and paying less attention to the quality of the end products. What emerges as quite 
evident from all the interview accounts is that caring activities, under certain conditions, 
make people more efficient and increase their capacities to get more things done in a more 
focused way. 
It is also evident that one of the latent purposes of care is the production of emotional 
states that go in the direction of what Hammond (1990) calls “affective maximization,” a 
more or less conscious strategy to maximize the supply of positive emotions. It does not 
matter, for our purposes, whether this unanticipated outcome of care is conscious or 
unconscious, whether it is planned or unintended. The point is that the search for the 
“meanings of care” in the entire ecology of people’s lives brings to the surface important and 
understudied elements, perhaps a blend of new and old elements, which acquire a completely 
new sense in light of the Interaction Ritual model and with the inclusion of gay and single 
parents. One of these elements concerns precisely the energizing and empowering effects of 
care responsibilities that clearly help people not only to overcome the exhaustion connected 
with multi-task operations, but also to balance their perceived status exclusion from other 
settings.
Parenting Gives Me Energy
The energizing nature of care is illustrated by Jason’s case. In the following passage, Jason 
underlines the self-empowering effects of care responsibility, when he recalls the challenging 
period during which he was finishing his dissertation, teaching full-time, and being a dad:
6 William James, The Energies of Men, New York, Moffat, Yard and Company, 1913.
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R: It was a hellish couple of years. But at the same time I think being a dad helped me to 
balance out some of that. I mean I think if I would not have been a dad and would have just 
been trying to finish the dissertation while teaching full-time, I think I would have driven 
myself crazy. [….] Because for me parenting really gives me energy.
On the other hand, Sarah, a single mother, highlights how inhabiting all at once the 
statuses of single mother, part-time student, and full-time worker can create a sense of “non-
fitting” or status exclusion: 
R: Yeah, like I don’t know, it makes me feel like I don’t fit in very well at school.
I: You don’t fit in?
R: Well, because nobody in my department really has children […] and so I don’t know, the 
people are like at a different stage in their life because, even though they’re around the same 
age as me, they don’t have like a lot of responsibilities in life so they can go out and socialize 
and do whatever. And me, I don’t get to go out and socialize ever, and if I do, I have to take 
her with me. So it’s a different kind of social life. 
She also provides a description of the labeling process connected to the categorical 
identity of a single mom when she expresses other people’s negative prejudice toward her 
being a full-time working mother and a student: 
R: I feel like a lot of times when people find out that I’m a single parent they always have all 
these stereotypes of what I am and […] you know what I mean, stereotypes of what I’m 
supposed to be like. […] People just have stereotypes of what single parents are like, you 
know, that I don’t spend time with her and stuff like that. And I spend more time with her than 
most married moms do. […] People just have these stereotypes about… like that whole unwed 
mother kind of thing and me be a kind of stereotype [….] Yeah, like a married couple where 
the mother is like a homemaker and all that crap.
12
However, neither the non-fitting feeling nor the stereotypes connected to her status of 
single mother seem to affect her sense of self-confidence, energy, and motivation for action, 
in short, her level of emotional energy, when she concludes: 
R: I am [energetic]. I manage my time extremely well because I know […] other people, who 
have a lot less on their plate, who struggle to get all their work done; and I always get 
everything I need done, always. 
The Busier I Am, the More Effective I Am
In the same regard, Roger, father of three children, underscores an interesting paradox of care 
when he realizes how the challenges connected to the difficult balance between work, a 
master’s program, his wife’s pregnancy, and other family care related issues pushed him to 
become more effective and productive: 
R: […] My son was born in January of 2002 and the following August I started a master’s 
program at night. And those two things forced me to become a much better manager of time, 
to really allocate, you know, this much time for this, this much time for this. […] When I have 
a little bit less requirements to get done, fewer requirements, I’ve gotten lazy about being 
careful. […] Well, there’s an expression that if you want something to get done, ask a busy 
person to do it. And I think that definitely holds true for me. The busier I am, the more 
effective I am. 
Several other interviewees confirm the idea of the increased efficiency connected to 
the massive workload quite clearly. Byron, a wealthy financial advisor who, at the age of 52, 
decided to have a child with a close lesbian friend of his, is one of them. Byron and his friend 
live in separate homes and worlds, but they share childcare responsibilities:
R: I became extremely efficient after the baby was born in doing the work with 30 or 40 
percent less time and I still managed to do it all.
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I: Really? 
R: Absolutely, mm, hmm. Because time had many more things packed into it so I had to 
become more efficient – a rather easy thing to do. If you want someone to do something, you 
pick someone who is busy to make sure it gets done.
Energy Begets Energy
Not only can care responsibilities produce an extra layer of energy, inducing people to 
become more efficient and more focused in achieving their goals and getting things done; 
they also possess an emotion-enhancing effect which creates positive loops of emotional 
energy production. Roger raises quite spontaneously the theme of the “energizing power” of 
care, stressing how the emotional energy deriving from his caring activities not only 
compensates for the physical exhaustion but is also positively reflected on his job. Referring 
to his three children, he says: 
It’s unbelievable, they just have two speeds it seems, fast forward and stop. And that has to 
carry over to some degree. On the one hand it makes you exhausted because you have to keep 
up with them all the time, but on the other hand energy sort of begets more energy. So the kids 
go to bed and I’m tired, but at the same time I’m energized and I have the energy and the 
strength to keep working later at night that I might not have if they weren’t there. 
Several examples follow a similar wavelength. Julia, a single mother who happened to 
be delivering her daughter at the same time she lost her job, attributes the merits of her 
further education to the birth of her daughter, explaining how the energetic loop in which she 
was involved pushed her to think that it would “be best to nip it in the bud” and get through 
an additional temporary strain in order to reach a better social and economic position:
R: […] And in fact I probably wouldn’t have pursued education, the truth be known, had 
Sarah not be born. I made that decision based on her. I would have continued in the mental 
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health field and not thinking about summers off or the hours I’m working or the breaks I have 
off.
I: So you improved your education because you had a kid.
R: Right, I went back to school.
I: It sounds like a paradox.
R: Right, and I decided it would be best to nip it in the bud, get it over with when she was 
young, go full force, gung-ho, get through it and then I can relax and I’d have a career. And 
my income doubled, that was another good part of going back to school.
The word “energy” is constantly and spontaneously raised by all interviewees, and the 
energy loops that childcare “brings in” seem to be something that not only drive people to 
accomplish ordinary tasks, but also to explore completely new details of their life experience, 
details they probably would never have explored otherwise.
“Good Stress” and “Bad Stress”
An interesting distinction between “good stress” (which is not resented or is even 
experienced as a “good thing”) and “bad stress” is made in the following:
There’s good stress and there’s bad stress, but the stress that causes the feeling of 
responsibility in care giving, in a way, that’s not resented. I like the opportunity to have the 
pressure and the stress of caring for this child, so it’s a good thing.
Most respondents define the stress associated with their care activities as “good 
stress”; and even when it is “bad stress”, it can be transformed. An example of bad stress 
transformed into good stress is offered by Jean, a single caregiver who looked after her dying 
father for a long period. Critical care can activate a loop of automatisms by which people just 
keep on getting things done or developing new habits which are all focused on taking care of 
the emergency while at the same time upholding working routines and preserving a 
psychological equilibrium. Even in the worse and most critical circumstances, care seems to 
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become at the same time the cause of the distress and its remedy that is the emotional energy 
with which to handle it:
It was hard. I did not go on vacation for the last two years; I did not do anything but work, play 
some sports locally and take care of my family. And, you know, I had a drink every night when 
I got home, I had a glass of wine as soon as I got home because that was the only thing that I 
could, like I needed to decompress for a half an hour by myself. Every day was a fight, was a 
struggle. I got up because, and I got out of bed and I went to work because I knew that I might 
have to take care of my father for the rest of his natural life, however long that was. […]I got 
up in the morning because my dad was around. That was what I did.
A serious illness cannot but be a traumatic event with severe repercussions on the 
caregiver’s psychological, emotional, and physical health. Jean’s story assumes dramatic 
tones during the interview because she was particularly affectionate to her father and looked 
at him as a unique model of reference. Nevertheless, beyond the unquestionably draining 
aspects of her care experience, she eventually finds her way to give it a totally different 
meaning. At the end of her exhausting, draining, and solitary journey through her father’s 
illness and death, Jean recuperates a new sense of her personal identity and self-worth. 
He was my guy and I miss him. [Crying] I cry daily for my dad. I mean he’s been gone for six 
months – he was the best guy in the world.
Jean does not seem to realize that what she probably misses now is not only her father, but 
also her taking care of him -- that chaotic, critical, and distressful period itself that produced 
so much pressure on her. One of the common characteristics about critical care is forgetting 
soon about its negative or more problematic aspects and not viewing even the most difficult 
times as unbearable anymore. Eventually, people rediscover new balances and existential 
priorities, which are often characterized not only by higher levels of emotional maturity, but 
also by a sharper awareness of their trajectory as caregivers. The “activating” or motivating 
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power of care seems to drive people not only to get things done, but also to find a correct and 
effective balance between different needs. What Jean is still mourning is not just the absence 
of her father, but also the absence of care, the sudden vacuum created after such a dense and 
intense emotional period, for better or for worse. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Most of the scholarship on care typically focuses on the gendered costs of care and on its 
draining aspects. Less attention is paid to the consequences of being excluded from care or 
not being acknowledged as an entitled and legitimate caregiver. Even less attention is paid to 
the inherently rewarding aspects of care and to its positive consequences in terms of status 
membership, increased productivity, and emotional energy production. 
Emotions constitute the link between doing care at the micro level of interactions and 
doing or undoing difference at the macro level of social structures. Different ways to do care 
and to do gender must be taken into account if we want to grasp a truly comprehensive 
picture of the phenomenon of care. It is important, therefore, to add a focus on different kinds 
of carers, not only theoretically—to fill the gaps—but also strategically—to increase equality. 
By focusing on the interactional processes that reproduce inequality, the phenomenological 
approach I propose here helps us to shed light on both the conservative forces reproducing 
inequality and the potential for cultural change. Since social categorizations (such as gender 
or sexual orientation) are not likely to disappear, we can at least reduce the cultural beliefs 
attached to them that reproduce inequality. Thus, for example, if sex categorization is so 
embedded in social relations that it is most likely to persist, the interactional processes can 
change or cancel cultural beliefs about male rationality or female emotionality (Ridgeway 
and Correll 2000). Similarly, if the labeling process by which we reproduce a difference 
between gay parents (or single parents) and heterosexual parents (between “atypical families” 
and “traditional families”) is likely to remain in the near future, the interactional processes 
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can challenge and erode cultural beliefs about heterosexual parenthood and families as 
“natural” and gay or single parenthood and families as unusual and/or “odd”. Repositioning 
care in situated interaction, while shedding light on its latent purposes and clarifying the 
central role emotions play in the reproduction of inequality, allows us to address many of the 
theoretical problems connected to reification and to transform them into empirical ones, 
analyzed in specific contexts.
Caregivers experience both positive and negative emotional states in caregiving 
situations. They can perceive both moderate burden and great satisfaction at the same time. 
Further studies on the rewarding and energizing aspects of care may help to broaden our 
understanding of how we can reduce the degree of burden while increasing the sense of 
satisfaction. Acknowledging the intrinsic value of care and highlighting its productivity and 
self-empowering consequences does not mean giving voice to a romanticized view of the 
world or failing to recognize the draining aspects of care, but rather capitalizing on care as a 
long-term investment and a resource. Such capitalization can be accomplished by facilitating 
conditions under which care is self-empowering and productive and by reducing those under 
which it is constraining or emotional energy draining. In doing that, we can also reduce the 
inequality connected to this fundamental activity.
18
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